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The union which was concluded between Sweden and 
Norway in 1814 was from the Swedish side, meant to be of a permanent 
character. ’My great ambition’, the Swedish king, Carl Johan, declared in 
1824, ’is to establish a complete union between Sweden and Norway’ and 
similarity ’in all branches of the internal administration’.1 This wish was 
shared by the dominant political circles in Sweden; and in Norway, too, 
strong forces through the most part of the 19th century gave their sup­
port to the union. Still, it ended in separation. This article aims to shed 
some light on why it ended this way and discribe certain aspects of the 
relationship between the two countries up to the breach in 1905.
While the Danish king had sided with Napoleon in the last phase of 
struggle between the then Great Powers, Sweden had thrown its lot in 
with the opposition and had secured guarantees from Russia and Great 
Britain that Norway should be given to her provided that Swedish mili­
tary forces took part in the war against France on the Continent. Carl 
Johan, one of Napoleon’s former generals, who had been elected succes­
sor to the Swedish throne in 1809, was the principal strategist behind 
the campaign which led to victory in the decisive battle at Lipsk in Oc­
tober 1813. In spite of that he had reasons to suspect the Great Powers of 
wanting to renounce on the promises given to him concerning Norway. 
This forms the backdrop for his decision to take the matter in his own 
hands and -  instead of leading his forces directly south to take part in 
the final operations against France -  he turned north and invaded the 
Danish duchies of Sleswig-Holstein; thus hoping to force the Danish king
1 Seip, Jens Arup, Utsikt over Norges historie, f0rste del, s. 73, Oslo 1974.
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to relinquish Norway and present the Great Powers with a fait accompli 
which it would be difficult to set aside.
The military part of the operation was soon accomplished. The Danish 
forces retreated and Fredrik VI could see no other course open to him 
than to ask for a negotiated settlement. The outcome was that Norway 
was ceded to the king of Sweden (incidentally without the old Norwegian 
dependencies of Greenland, Iceland and the Faeroe Island, about which 
history the Swedish negotiator was too little informed to make claims 
on). (The Treaty of Kiel, January 1814).
A period followed when Sweden, as a consequence of her military ob­
ligations on the Continent, was unable to grab the prey Denmark had 
been forced to give up. In the meantime the initiative was seized in Nor­
way. Elections were held in a hurry to a constitutional assembly, which 
established the fact that more than four hundred years of union with 
Denmark had come to an end and declared Norway to be independent. 
Royal absolutism was replaced by a written constitution, which was re­
markably liberal and democratic by the standards of the day. While Nor­
wegian historians have agreed that the international situation opened 
the way for this transformation, there has been some debate about the 
role played by internal factors in the realization of the opportunities 
created. -  Had Norway in the decades leading up to the 1814 seen a de­
monstrable growth in national consciousness which came to full bloom 
during this year; or would it perhaps be more in line with the facts to 
state that freedom and constitution were given the Norwegian people as 
a gift so to speak?
On the one hand historians have pointed to the economic development 
which had taken place in Norway and which had lent the country more 
weight within the union. The Napoleonic wars had led to separation (due 
to the English blocade) and had had as its consequence the estab­
lishment of central bodies of administration in Norway. Opposition had 
been voiced against the King’s policies, which, it was felt, had sacrificed 
Norwegian interests for the benefit of Denmark. Some had even worked 
for a dissolvement of the union and independence — not full independence 
but a greater extent of sovereignty, including a constitutional govern­
ment, which, they hoped, could be realized in a new union with Sweden.
As things turned out, however, it was not these people who in the ini­
tial phase came to dominate the development; the initiative was seized 
by the party which congregated around Christian Fredrik, since 1813 
Norwegian viceregent and heir to the Danish throne. It would seem evi­
dent that the only reasonable outcome of their endeavours could be noth­
ing than a renewal of the old union. Stated in its extreme form, it has 
been said that Norwegian independence was bom from a love of Den­
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mark. The prince, however, was forced by the circumstances to mask his 
intentions and to put on a performance where Norwegian independence 
and a constitutional government were declared to be his objectives. Thus, 
it was hoped, it would be possible to secure the support of the population 
and at the same time to legitimize the revolt against the Treaty of Kiel in 
the eyes of The Great Powers.
It seems obvious that for the Prince’s party to be able to appeal to a 
particular Norwegian national spirit, something of the kind must already 
have been in existence. In the course of the following hectic months this 
patriotism undoubtedly grew in strength, partly from a reaction against 
the Treaty of Kiel, partly as a consequence of the propaganda imple­
mented by the ’Independence’ Party. Words created the kind of feelings 
which they -  albeit for tactical reasons -  were meant to propagate. 1814, 
says the Norwegian historian Jens Arup Seip, saw not only the birth of a 
state but the ’rebirth of a nation’.2
On May 17th (Norway’s National Day) the Constitution was approved 
and Christian Fredrik was elected king. At the time Norway was not rec­
ognized by any other country. Her shipping and trade were the subject of 
a boycott by the Great Powers. In the near future a war against the 
(battle) experienced and superior forces of a neighbouring country 
seemed likely. -  The basic question remained, whether Norway’s new­
found independence could be maintained under the conditons.
Christian Fredrik had based his expectations on the attitude of the 
Great Powers, and in particular on that of Great Britain. When it be­
came clear, however, that both Russia and Great Britain insisted that 
the promises given to Sweden must be fullfilled he seems at an early 
stage to have concluded that the answer to the above question must be 
negative. When, in spite of this, a war broke out between Norway and 
Sweden this was due partly to the fact that the Swedish demands, given 
in the form in which they initially were presented, were regarded as un­
acceptable; partly because a war which led to a military defeat, was con­
sidered necessary to force the Norwegian public opinion to accept some 
kind of union with Sweden.
The way he waged the war: defensively, retreating to avoid major 
battles, demaged his reputation at that time and in the eyes of several 
subsequent Norwegian historians; while others have pointed to the fact 
that a union with Sweden was inevitable under the circumstances and 
that the conditions for peace were in all probability, the best that could 
be achieved.
A major point in the peace treaty was an obligation undertaken by 
Carl Johan to accept the Norwegian constitution of May 17. The only
2 Seip, Utsikt..., F0rste del, s. 15.
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changes allowed for were those necessitated by the union. In this there 
lay a recognition of Norwegian sovereignty and equality within the 
union. There has been considerable speculation as to what motivated 
Garl Johan to go so far. One cause was certainly his wish to reach an 
agreement before the Congress of Vienna met and interference by the 
Great Powers might complicate the picture. A contributing factor may 
have been Carl Johan’s ambitions to take power in France, which he 
could only achieve through the support of that country’s liberal circles. 
Apart from the personal motives which may have influenced Carl Johan, 
historians have pointed to the consistency between an accomodating atti­
tude and that line in Swedish policy towards Norway which had aimed to 
win support based on contacts with, and promises given to, constitution­
ally minded groups.
Most important, presumbly, was the fact that the essential goals, 
from a Swedish point of view, had been achieved already. When Carl 
Johan had been appointed successor to the throne it had above all been 
with the expectation that he -  with his military expertise, his position in 
France and many contacts around Europe -  would help compensate for 
the loss of Finland (1809). Military and foreign political considerations 
were, in other words, at the very heart of the union. Through the unifica­
tion with Norway and in view of the fact that the Constitution gave the 
king considerable authority concerning defence and foreign policy, 
Sweden’s strategic position had been radically altered. The danger repre­
sented by Finland under Russian control had been reduced. Sweden no 
longer had to fear a two-front war. As to the unforeseen degree of inde­
pendence obtained by Norway and the all too liberal character of the con­
stitution, from Carl Johan’s point of view, he could reasonably hope to 
change that when the situation had stabilized.
The social and economic transformations were missing from the Nor­
wegian revolution of 1814; but added to the political aspect there was 
also a national one. A hitherto unknown patriotism had been created. 
Seen against the background of the events of this year the unification 
with Sweden, although formally it took place on a voluntary basis, was 
seen as a defeat. The new union, thus, was born with a defect.
The Norwegian constitution was built on a division of powers. Two 
state authorities were foreseen: the King and the parliament (Storting). 
Parliament was given the authority to pass laws and the budget. In addi­
tion it had a controlling function vis-a-vis the government and could im­
peach ministers who had exceeded their powers. Parliament met every 
third year and its session was stipulated to last three months. Prolonga- 
ment had to be granted by the king.
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Royal power was strong in that it possessed the initiative. The 
Storting debated bills which the king had brought before it. Furthermore 
the king was given a suspensive veto over ordinary Acts of Parliament 
(meaning in practice that if a bill was passed by three different Stortings 
over a period of nine years it came into effect without royal assent). It 
was unclear whether the same procedure applied to constitutional 
amendments, but it was not until the end of the union that this question 
was pushed to extremes. During the time when the Storting was not in 
session the king could enact temporary decrees, i.e. he could take mea­
sures which otherwise belonged within the Stortings sphere of influence, 
and whose legality would be decided upon by the next Storting.
As to defence and foreign policy, the Constitution provided that before 
the king could start a war the advice of the Norwegian government, as 
well as the Swedish, should be sought and a decision take place in an ex­
traordinary cabinet meeting with ministers from both cabinets present. 
Only part of the Norwegian military forces could be deployed outside the 
country, and the king was dependent on Parliament for money to arm 
and wage war. Other foreign policy matters could, in theory, be regarded 
as either exclusively Swedish (in which case they should be discussed in 
the Swedish cabinet), or as exclusively Norwegian (discussed in the Nor­
wegian cabinet) or as matters of common interest (the matter should be 
dealt with at a cabinet meeting including ministers from both Sweden 
and Norway).
It was up to the king personally to appoint his ministers. He was ob­
liged to lay all matters of importance before cabinet. The ministers for 
their part had a duty to protest officially if they considered that king’s 
decisions were not in compliance with the laws or would harm the na­
tion’s interests. Those who did not protest in this way ran the risk of im­
peachment.
In practice the authority of the king became divided in a way not in­
tended by the Constitution: the main part of the Norwegian government 
was seated in Christiania, the capital of Norway (later to be called Oslo); 
while only a ministerial branch was maintained in Stockholm, close to 
the king’s person.
An investigation of the kind of political system which developed must 
rely on a description of the balance of power in the constitutional tri­
angle: king -  government -  Storting, and how they placed themselves in 
relation to each other over time. In the case of the Storting the agree­
ment in constitutional matters is striking. This consensus undoubtedly 
developed because the Storting felt its authority threatened from the 
side of the king. Carl Johan may well have had a personal inclination 
towards a strong monarchy; he also had to take into cosideration that
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conservative forces in Sweden, and in particular the Nobility, looked 
upon Norway as a compensation for Finland and was bent on bringing 
about a closer union. For Carl Johan, who still could not feel secure in 
his position, it must have been essential to strengthen his standing 
through adherence to leading political circles in this matter.
The most far-reaching of the amendments put forward by Carl Johan 
during the 1820s was one which would have granted the king an abso­
lute veto over ordinary Acts of Parliament. Other bills aimed at reducing 
freedom of expression, to increase the opportunity of the king to in­
fluence the debates in Parliament and to make the official class more de­
pendent on the king personally. The Storting was also asked to allow the 
king to appoint a new nobility (after it had abolished the old one in 
1814).
Initially the Constitution had not been looked upon as a sacrosanct 
unalterable document; Carl Johan’s aggressive attitude changed the 
mood, however. The opinion took hold that to grant the king an absolute 
veto in reality implied granting it to Sweden. The struggle for national 
independence and equality came to be seen as a struggle against the 
authority of the king. In this context the Constitution was regarded as a 
bulwark. It might have ambiguities and deficiencies but you did not start 
tearing it down in a situation where the enemy was camped outside.
Carl Johan’s extra-parliamentary methods included the use of bribes, 
from a royal coffer well-filled after many campaigns. His agents en­
couraged discontent among the farmers at a time when the country’s fi­
nances were in dire straits. On a couple of occasions he gathered troops 
around the capital while the Storting was in session. Also he liked to 
refer to threats from the Great Powers, who allegedly would not tolerate 
a watered down royal veto and the abolition of the nobility.
He was up against a parliament that was dominated by the official 
class (meaning senior officials, both in the central and local administra­
tion). Their leading role went back to the time of absolutism. The reason 
why they continued to lead after 1814 had to do with the fact that no 
other class was in a position to do so. The nobility, always weak in Nor­
way, had been voted out of existence. The bourgeoisie had seen their for­
tunes crumble in the crisis following the Napoleonic wars. The farmers 
(whose arable land was small in a European context) were not yet politi­
cally educated or conscious enough to assert themselves.
The official class descended, to a great extent, from families who had 
emigrated from Denmark. Their spoken language was in the main simi­
lar to Danish and they continued to be rooted in a culture outside the 
country’s borders. One Norwegian historian has compared the situation 
in the decades following 1814 with that experienced in former colonies:
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’The mother country had been forced to cut the ties and the colonists 
were faced with the task of establishing a system which enabled them to 
maintain the privileges that they formerly, by virtue of support from the 
mother country, had enjoyed.’3
One way in which the official class could legitimize their standing, was 
to take the lead in the national struggle. It felt all the more natural for 
them to do so as several of Carl Johan’s bills were aimed directly at under­
mining their own position. His flirtation with the farmers contributed to 
distance them further from the king. Thus, during the whole of Carl Johan’s 
reign (which ended in 1844), the policy pursued by the official class aimed 
at reducing the king’s powers in favour of those of the Storting.
The government for its part might consider greater freedom of move­
ment and increased independence in its relation with Parliament as a 
good idea. But it harboured no plans aimed at altering the Constitution -  
that would have been surprising considering that the government, too, 
was a bastion of the official class. The government was however in a dif­
ficult position. Being closer to the monarch than most members of Parlia­
ment it received a clearer picture as to the king’s intentions and the 
dangers involved in too much intransigence on part of the Storting, and 
often found itself in the unevitable situation of having to perform a 
balancing act between royal anger and the Storting’s watchful suspision.
One by one the king’s amendments were rejected by Parliament, accom­
panied by conciliatory phrases, but firmly enough. In spite of that there is 
reason to believe that gradually a consensus developed that the Union was 
in the best interest of the country. The national struggle was for equality, 
not for dissolution. Carl Johan’s ambition to make good the rushed job of 
1814, his temperament and lack of insight into Norwegian politics led, how­
ever, on several occasions to crisis. Dramatic gestures, involving threats of 
violence, created the impression that he moved all the way to the edge of a 
coup d’etat -  and then the whole affair came to nothing.
During the 1830s the shift in king’s policy towards a more defensive 
attitude was remarkable. Several explanations have been put forward, 
one involving Carl Johan’s personality: caution was a strong feature in 
his character and for him, an upstart among the royality of Europe, it 
must have been important to stay within the boundaries of legitimacy -  
in other words, not to be seen as violating the Constitution. Also his re­
quests to the Great Powers concerning Norway were negative, from his 
point of view (contrary to the impression he tried to give). Russia, on 
whose attitude the King placed particular weight, feared that Sweden 
might try to revenge the defeat of 1809 and consistently opposed a closer
3 Seip, Utsikt..., f0rste del, s. 66.
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and potentially stronger union. Another problem arose in that opposition 
in Sweden started looking across the border to Norway and taking in­
spiration from the more liberal political climate there, a development 
which served to make both the King and the conservatives more sceptical 
about a closer merger.
As Carl Johan’s reign came to an end it was the Storting that was on 
the offensive. The King’s authority to issue temporary decrees was cur­
tailed and the Storting’s right to have its sessions prolonged came to be 
regarded as customary.
While Carl Johan had thought that the Union had established its nat­
ural geographical borders, his son and successor, Oscar I, harboured ex­
pansionist plans more in line with earlier Swedish foreign policy. Fin­
land was to be reconquered through an alliance with the Western powers 
during the Crimean War; while the conflict between Denmark and the 
German states was seen as an opportunity to expand the Union to in­
clude all three Scandinavian countries.
Scandinavism was a movement which made itself in the whole of 
Scandinavia, reaching its high point during Denmark’s conflicts with 
Germany in 1848 and 1864. The underlying philosophy had its parallels 
abroad in pan-Slavism and pan-Germanism. A characteristic feature of 
Norwegian Scandinavism was the idea that Denmark could act as a 
counterweight against Swedish dominance. Several prominent Nor­
wegian politicians were engaged in the movement; its social basis was, 
however, limited to academics and members of the higher bourgeoisie, 
while the farmers, who from the 1830s onwards made up the majority in 
Parliament, were cleary rejectionist in their attitude.
Oscar I -  a charmless, introverted, intelligent and almost friendless 
manipulator4 -  had been able to direct the Union’s foreign policy without 
much interference. But after the middle of the century the development 
of society undermined the premises for monarch’s personal display of 
power. The decay in royal authority was accelerated under Oscar’s 
successor, Carl XV (1859-1872), also as a consequence of this king’s lack 
of interest in the ordinary business of government. In the diary of one of 
his longstanding ministers we are (more and more) frequently told about 
so-called ’standing cabinet meetings’, where the king, before riding off 
with his ’dear staff, decides upon so many matters -  in accordance with 
the ministers’ recommendations -  that he has hardly enough time to sign 
the bills in question.5
4 Bj0rgo, Rian, Kaartvedt, Norsk utenrikspolitisk historie, Selvstendighet og union, 
Fra middelalderen til 1905, s. 272, Universitetsforlaget 1995.
5 Aug. Chr., Mantheys Dagbfiger, Kra 1909-1919.
Aspects o f the Union between Sweden and Norway (1814-1905) 233
The development in the constitutional triangle, king-government- 
Storting can be described in two stages: first the Storting, plundered the 
king’s authority as much as it possibly could; after that the government 
seized the remaining assets. For the government in Christiania to be 
able to consolidate its position in relation to the king it was necessary, 
firstly, that the ministerial branch in Stockholm was reduced to a more 
forwarding office; secondly, that one minister emerged as the uncon­
tested leader of the cabinet and, thirdly, that it became a body with 
power to co-opt (i.e. to recruit new ministers without royal interference). 
All of these conditions were fullfilled at an early stage after Fredrik 
Stang became senior minister in 1861.
There remained, however, one field in which the king continued to 
exert considerable influence, namely in military matters. The king was 
to sole connecting link between the two countries’ armed forces, which 
goes some way to explain this anomaly; added to that was the fact that 
the strengthening of the Union’s military capability and the foreign- 
political schemes connected with that were almost the only subjects that 
Carl took any interest in. In his imagination he saw himself as the man 
who would restore the Kalmar Union (between the three Nordic coun­
tries, lasting, with interruptions, from 1389 to 1521); and his dreams 
went even further. A quotation from 1863 may serve to illustrate the 
king’s ambitions, ’I need a war, and a war I must have; either through 
the Poles against Russia or the Danes against Germany.’6
Although the government had no sympathy with Carl’s foreign policy 
inspirations and worked, in tandem with the Swedish government, to 
thwart them, it was forced to put the king’s plans for a reform of the 
armed forces before Storting. These included an amendment which 
would have made it possible to deploy a larger share of the Norwegian 
army outside the country. This part of the army was to receive more 
funds and training, making it into an elite unit, and a new organization 
which would facilitate cooperation with Swedish forces. The debate con­
cerning military issues in the 1860s was to play an important part in the 
establishment of a more systematic opposition in the 1870s. It was 
possible to use these matters against the government, whose hands, to 
its regret, were tied by the royal initiative. The majority in the Storting, 
i.e. the farmers, had no liking for the king’s expansionist plans and they 
came out decidedly against increases in the defence budget.
During the debate the leader of the opposition, Johan Sverdrup, ar­
gued that Norway had to be particularly on guard against letting its in­
fluence over defence be reduced -  for the reason that she had no foreign
6 Jansson, Allan, Den svenske utrikespolitikens historia, bd. Ill: 1844-1872, s. 187, 
Stockholm 1961.
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minister.7 The fact was that since 1814 the minister for foreign affairs 
had been Swedish, although his nationality was not determined by any 
document defining the Union.
The issue was taken up by an official committee with members from 
both countries, appointed in 1865 after a Swedish initiative. It is prob­
able that the timing of the Swedish revisionist drive had to do with the 
fact that after the Crimean War Russia was no longer in a position to act 
as a check on Sweden’s old ambition of a closer union. In the committee’s 
report the equality of the two countries was closely observed in most re­
spects; however, in certain fields the committee proposed to legalize an 
opposite practice which had established itself, and in particular that the 
royal residence should be in Stockholm and that the Swedish minister 
for foreign affairs should be in charge of foreign policy on behalf of both 
countries. In spite of this the committee’s proposals would have granted 
Norway more influence over foreign policy than previously -  only, within 
the framework of a closer union.
Two lines of Norwegian nationalism manifested themselves in re­
sponse: On the one hand, the government, still dominated by the official 
class, through a pragmatic cooperation with Sweden sought a step-by- 
step solution to the main issue and would be willing to accept that the in­
stitutional framework binding the two countries together was extended 
in return for joint consulation and a say on equal terms with Sweden in 
foreign policy matters. On the other hand an increasingly aggressive and 
nationalistic opposition set itself firmly against a closer union and was 
opposed to any formalizing of Swedish privileges. -  The latter point of 
view won the day and the report from the Union committee was rejected 
by a large majority in the Storting in 1871.
After Sweden had ceased to be regarded as a threat the union could 
become a basis for internal political stability and a tool for those who 
wanted to maintain the status quo. The government could use the king’s 
authority, which it had now largely taken over, and support from conser­
vatives in Sweden against the opposition. The tendency became manifest 
during the 1870s. At the same time a polarization of the political debate 
took place in Norway.
The conflict between the state authorities came to a bend over the 
issue of the ministers’ admittance to Parliament and a resulting obliga­
tion to defend their policies there. The reform would replace a formal- 
juridical ministerial responsibility with a political-moral one and make 
the government more dependent on having support from a majority in 
the Storting. The government, which had been frightened by the strength
7 Stortingstiden.de 1866, s. 256.
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of the opposition and increasingly saw itself as the defender of a minior- 
ity in society, felt that the reform would tip the balance of power danger­
ously in favour of the Storting, and in particular after annual sessions 
had been introduced in 1869.
The situation was complicated by the fact that the reform would demand 
a change in the Constitution. The question of the king’s veto thus came to 
the forefront. Oscar II (Norwegian king 1872-1905) had received his educa­
tion and formative impressions at a time when the king’s personal author­
ity was still strong, and he never resigned himself to its decline. A conserva­
tive by principle he was firmly in favour of maintaining the monarch’s 
independence in relation to the Storting. The union dictated the same 
policy, in Oscar’s judgement, since the monarch’s authority represented the 
strongest tie between the two countries and was the only effective means 
for Swedish influence in Norwegian affairs. The constellation king-govem- 
ment on one side and the majority of Parliament on the other lent the con­
flict a democratic as well as a national aspect.
The battle was waged with increasing intensity. Attempts by the king 
and the government to enlist support in Sweden met little response at 
this stage. The conservative Swedish government accused their Nor­
wegian colleagues of endangering the king’s authority through their in­
transigence and thereby weakening the Union. The Liberals in Sweden 
displayed a great deal of understanding for the views held by the Nor­
wegian opposition, so much so that if the conflict was allowed to develop 
further it might well become a dangerous ferment in Swedish political 
life as well. It should therefore be brought to an end as soon as possible, 
according to the Swedish government.
1884 marks a turning point in Norwegian political history. The old 
regime came to an end when the official class had to give up their bastion 
of power in the government and a greater degree of political account­
ability and dependency was introduced in the government’s relationship 
to the Storting. It followed that the new government appointed by the 
king this year had the support of the majority in Parliament. As part of a 
compromise the issue of the king’s veto was set aside.
It was only natural that the new government should insist that 
parliamentary accountability also had to include foreign policy. Hence 
two alternatives presented themselves: either a continual common for­
eign policy body responsible to a joint committee of parliamentarians 
from both countries -  a solution rejected by the Liberals because they 
feared it would lead to a closer union (a common Parliament, possibly), 
or a separate Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which became the 
government’s preferred option. In Sweden the exasperation in response 
to Norwegian demands was rising. It was felt that the Liberals
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(’Venstre’) in reality were aiming at a dissolution of the Union, which 
was seen as vital to Sweden’s security interests. In 1895 the danger of 
war between the two countries was acute, but a violent confrontation 
was averted through a climb-down on the part of the Norwegians. As far 
the Norwegian Conservatives (’H0yre’), they accepted that foreign policy 
should be included in the matters for which the government was answer- 
able to Parliament; they emphasized, however, that a solution should be 
found through negotiations with the Swedes. Only at a later stage, after 
it had become clear that the party’s loyalty to the union was a liability 
with a more nationalistically minded electorate and when a satisfying so­
lution, from a Norwegian point of view, apparently could not be found, 
did the party change its mind and sacrificed the union.
The Union between Norway and Sweden was not the outcome of the two 
nations approaching each other and growing together over time. We have 
been able to ascertain that the Norwegians felt that the Union had been 
forced upon them and thus that it was born with a defect. In principle it 
was to be a union between two equal partners, but from the start the Nor­
wegians felt inferior and several factors contributed to keeping this senti­
ment alive (i.e. the issue of national symbols, the flag, the king’s title, etc) 
and in particular the conflict concerning Norway’s influence over foreign 
policy affairs. Sweden’s aggressiveness, aimed at a greater degree of amal­
gamation, resulted in a Norwegian counter-reaction, led by the official class, 
who traditionally had been closely attached to Denmark and also had the 
most to lose should the king’s plans be realized. The Norwegians were also 
on guard against Swedish influence on Norwegian (i.e. Danish) written lan­
guage. As to cultural life in general, what was regarded as typically Nor­
wegian was held in high esteem and encouraged. It should be underlined, 
however, that the national struggle at this stage aimed at equality within 
the Union, not dissolution of the same.
From the 1830s onwards a relaxation of tension takes place in mat­
ters related to the Union. The farmers now made up the majority in Par­
liament and their chief concern was a ’cheap’ state and the transfer of 
public tasks to locally elected bodies. They had no enthusiasm for dynas­
tic projects aimed at an extended or closer union. The same applied to 
the majority of the upper classes. Scandinavianism became a mere epi­
sode in Norvegian politics.
During the 1870s increasingly the conservative government allied it­
self with and exploited the authority of the king. The fact that the 
monarch became so closely associated with a regime condemned to 
downfall resulted in the undermining of the king’s position and, to a cer­
tain extent, also to that of the Union. King and Union came to be seen as 
obstacles in the way of democratic development.
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During the last phase of the Union, controversy concerning the in­
fluence over foreign policy became the centre of attention. The Liberals, 
who were in power for most of the period 1895-1905, were the aggressive 
party. Venstre’s need of such an issue for tactical reasons has been 
pointed out. The party’s union-policy served to glue it together, function­
ing as a counterweight to a whole range of controversial issues (concern­
ing social policy, universal suffrage, etc), which pressure groups and pro­
fessional and industrial bodies threw into the arena during the 1890s. 
Some historians have even talked of the party’s nationalism as a ’substi­
tute motive’; while others have pointed out that on the international 
scene the same period was characterized by jingoism on the part of the 
Great Powers and by smaller nations’ struggle to uphold their identity. 
This ideological climate presumably influenced Scandinavian politicians 
as well. Generally speaking, it is difficult to state with certainty what 
are the motives underlying political standpoints. In the case of Venstre’s 
policy in the 1890s we have to confine ourselves to pointing out that its 
appeal to Norwegian nationalism found resonance in the population, and 
that it had a unifying function with regard to the party’s followers.
At the time of the elections in 1903 it seemed as if a compromise with 
Sweden would be possible, and economic and social issues came to domi­
nate the campaign. Victorious was a new constellation, called ’Samlings- 
partiet’ (The Unitary Party), made up of conservative and moderate 
politicians, many of them businessmen. They were people who felt 
threatened by Venstre’s costly reform policy and who saw it as their 
main task to speak up for business and to defend private ownership.
The constitutional conflict over foreign policy was only of secondary 
interest to these people. They hoped a compromise with Sweden would be 
possible and that this compromise would be so satisfactory, in Norwegian 
eyes, that it would also appeal to moderate forces within Venstre, so that 
a division between them and the radicals would result -  a division 
coinciding with the one Samlingspartiet’s men saw as desirable for inter­
nal political reasons.
It was only when these expectations proved illusory -  after the mood 
in Sweden had changed and it seemed impossible to reach an acceptable 
solution -  that the government made up its mind in favour of a uni­
lateral liquidation of the Union. National feelings certainly played a part 
in the decision. Also -  in that the conflict over the Union was terminated 
-  Samlingspartiet hoped to prepare the way for the kind of anti-radical 
and anti-socialist alliance which was the party’s main objective.
As for the economy, a breach was possible without serious con­
sequences for either country. Sweden came only in the second rank of
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Norway’s trading partners. Internationally -  both economically and cul­
turally -  Norway was markedly Western-oriented; while Sweden’s most 
important ties were to the south, to the German ’Reich’. It is also clear 
that the Union had not led to emigration on a large scale from one 
country to the other. The two peoples had never mixed.
In a more general sense it has been pointed out that unions between 
two countries have proved problematic (to make work) — if a development 
towards amalgamation, in line with Swedish policy in 1814 and after, is 
not accepted.
’An alliance between two equally big nations can be problematic 
enough. But even greater -  yes, in practice almost inextricable -  are the 
difficulties which have to be faced in a union between a bigger and a 
smaller country; at least if the latter is to retain an acceptable degree of 
independence and equality.’8
In the larger context the dissolution in 1905 can be seen as resulting 
from the fact that during the 91 years the Union had lasted Norway had 
grown stronger. She had acquired the kind of political institutions 
belonging to an independent state. Economically she was now in a posi­
tion that allowed her to stand on her own feet, and after the humiliating 
climb-down in 1895 Norway had consistently built up her armed forces 
so that she was able to defend herself. In this perspective independence 
comes as a consequence of a growth in national consciousness. In this 
context should be mentioned the development which had taken place in 
the country’s cultural life,' whose foremost representatives had attained 
international fame and recognition -  this factor, too, had served to 
strengthen national identity and pride.
During the last years of the Union the Swedish foreign policy estab­
lishment had tried to influence the Great Powers to distance themselves 
from Norway’s independence aspirations and had sought their support for a 
forced revision of the relations between the two countries. The reactions had 
been negative, and in 1905 Sweden had in reality suffered defeat in her at­
tempts to mobilize the international community in aid of an aggressive 
policy towards Norway. More important for Sweden’s attitude was, how­
ever, the development towards democracy which had taken place in the 
country and the rejection, by the liberals and the socialist, of an armed 
settlement of the conflict. The opinion had gained ground that an associa­
tion which was not built on voluntary adherence and mutual trust, had no 
future. Hence, the Union between Norway and Sweden, which had been in­
itiated on the battlefield, came to a peaceful conclusion.
8 Fuglun, Per, Norges historie, bd. 12 Norge i st0peskjeen 1884-1920, Oslo 1988.
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